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ABSTRACT
In addition to visiting popular sites such as Facebook and
Google, web users often visit more modest sites, such as
those operated by bloggers, or by local organizations such as
schools. Such sites, which we call “Just Plain Sites” (JPSs),
are likely to inadvertently present greater privacy risks than
highly popular sites, because they are unable to afford pri-
vacy expertise. To assess the prevalence of the privacy risks
to which JPSs may inadvertently be exposing their visitors,
we examined privacy practices that could be observed by
analysis of JPS landing pages. We found that many JPSs
collect a great deal of information from their visitors, and
share a great deal of information about their visitors with
third parties. For example, we found that an average of 7
third party organizations are informed when a user visits a
JPS. Many JPSs additionally permit a great deal of track-
ing of their visitors. For example, we found that third party
cookies are used by more than 50% of JPSs. We also found
that many JPSs use deprecated or unsafe security practices.
Our goal is not to scold JPS operators, but to raise aware-
ness of these facts among both JPS operators and visitors,
possibly encouraging operators to take greater care in their
implementations, and visitors to take greater care in how,
when, and what they share.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.4.1 [Computers and Society]: Public Policy Issues—
Privacy ; K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Infor-
mation Systems]: Security and Protection—Unauthorized
access
Keywords
Web privacy, Just Plain Sites, Third party organizations,
Information leakage, Facebook login
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1. INTRODUCTION
Whereas much attention has been paid to the risks posed
by the web-based collection of private information by large
organizations such as banks, large corporations, and the gov-
ernment (e.g., [1, 2, 3]), internet citizens also commonly visit
web sites operated by small organizations such as mom-
and-pop shops, blogs, sites for community activities, and
school clubs and teams. We refer to this category of sites as
“Just Plain Sites”(JPS’s), after Lave’s concept of“Just Plain
Folks”[4]. Whereas large, well-funded organizations have the
resources to operate in accordance with best privacy prac-
tices, JPSs are more likely to unintentionally expose their
visitors’ private information through inappropriate actions
(e.g., collecting more private information than required), or
inactions (e.g., failing to change default email templates to
hide account passwords).1
In the present work we analyze JPS “front pages”, in or-
der to assess the prevalence of some of the privacy risks to
which the operators of JPSs may be inadvertently expos-
ing their visitors. These are the practices that apply at the
very first encounter with a site, usually its home page (or,
more generally, its landing page). Our “front page” princi-
ple accords with a “front of the store” metaphor. Visitors
to a physical store should expect that in the front of the
store, where they are simply browsing, they needn’t be con-
cerned with their credit card information being stolen (at
least not by the store’s proprietor), whereas once they head
to the metaphorical “back of the store” to make a purchase
or to participate in some other interaction with the manage-
ment, they have made a conscious decision to hand over their
credit cards, etc., and have, one hopes, assessed the safety of
the situation, and decided with all appropriate concern and
knowledge to put themselves at whatever risk they might feel
necessary. Taking this concept back to the web: Once a visi-
tor clicks“checkout”(etc.) they are, by assumption, aware of
the privacy risks entailed by this transaction. Therefore, as
we are investigating violations and issues before that point,
we needn’t go deeply into the web site, preferring instead to
examine the privacy practices evident upon loading of the
home or landing page.
Numerous studies have examined the privacy policies and
practices of “specialist” web sites – i.e., sites whose subject-
1We will generally use the term “operator” to mean the
owner, operator, developer, etc. of a site.
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matter is regulated, for example, government sites, sites that
collect personal data from children under thirteen, and sites
that collect health or financial data [5, 1, 6]. Other studies
focus on the privacy practices of the most popular sites [7, 8,
9]. We chose to examine“non-specialist” sites with relatively
few visitors. Also, instead of studying the published privacy
policies appearing on those sites, we investigated what these
sites actually do (or not), not merely what they claim to do
(or not).
The web is, of course, extremely complex, and things go
on all the time that even experienced engineers are not aware
of; almost certainly the owners, operators, and proprietors
of JPSs are unaware of most of this under-the-hood activity.
Becoming aware of this may encourage them to take steps
to improve their practices, or at least to ensure that they
are doing whatever they are doing with clear knowledge of
the potential risks.
1.1 Privacy Principles for JPSs
Recognizing the importance of online privacy, many juris-
dictions have moved to regulate the collection, storage, pro-
cessing, and transfer of personal information [10, 11, 12]. Al-
though the regulations in these jurisdictions differ in detail,
they all address the topics of notice (for example, in the form
of privacy policies), visitor choice in limiting the collection
and transfer of their personal data, visitor access to their
stored data, data security, and enforcement procedures [13,
14]. These regulations apply to both popular web sites, such
as Google and Facebook, and to the less popular ones that
we have termed JPSs. In its June 1998 Report to Congress,
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) reiterated five Fair
Information Practice Principles (FIPPs): (1) Notice/Aware-
ness; (2) Choice/Consent; (3) Access/Participation; (4) In-
tegrity/Security; and (5) Enforcement/Redress [14], which
were first stated by the U.S. Department of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare in 1973, and which have been influential
in the formulations of the 1980 Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) Privacy Guidelines
and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Pri-
vacy Framework of 2004 [12].
JPS operators should be aware of at least the FIPPs,
OECD Guidelines, and APEC Framework, which we sum-
marize in terms of five principles: 1. Minimize collection:
The risk associated with communication and storage is pro-
portional to the amount and type of data collected. Col-
lect only the information needed for specific purposes, all of
which should be made explicit in a privacy policy, or through
other means, such as labeling at the point of collection.
2. Protect the data you collect : Sites that collect visitor
data obviously should have reasonable data security prac-
tices with respect to storage, disposal, and break-ins. In-
deed, the FTC requires such practices, however, enforcement
is extremely difficult and so essentially non-existent [12], and
is likely to be even more lax regarding JPSs, which present
a huge number of tiny targets. Moreover, even among ex-
perts there is disagreement about what “reasonable” means
[15]; the goal posts keep changing as criminal hackers up the
ante, and even expert engineers with the best-of-intentions
make mistakes. Faced with these complexities, some clear
precautions include requiring strong passwords, encryption
when transmitting and storing private data, avoiding the
long-term retention of private data by disposing of it as soon
as it has served its purpose, and developing a strong cyber-
security plan. 3. Minimize both intentional and uninten-
tional sharing : Third parties such as affiliates and service
providers, are likely not held to the same privacy standards
as a given site itself. Whereas it is less likely for JPSs to
have formal affiliates, it is quite common for them to uti-
lize service providers and third party services. For exam-
ple, many small sites utilize Google Analytics, Facebook lo-
gin, social icons such as “Like” buttons, and/or advertising
frames without realizing that these may be turning over in-
formation about their visitors to third parties, most of which
employ mysterious and complicated algorithms. This is of-
ten true even without the objects being clicked by the visitor
(for example, on page load). Therefore, all uses of third
party services that are not necessary for a site’s core opera-
tions should be considered suspect. 4. Post a privacy policy
that tells visitors what actually happens: To the extent pos-
sible, the published privacy policies should reflect what a
site actually does, not merely what is intended or required.
This is probably more difficult for JPSs operators who may
not fully understand what their site software is doing. 5.
Give visitors choice and access: Visitors should be able to
control their own data to the extent possible, for example,
through opt-in and opt-out buttons [16], especially when a
site intends to share data with a third party [17]. Visitors
should also be able to check, change, or delete their private
data, and their entire profile.
2. EXPERIMENTS
With these principles in mind, we conducted a number
of experiments with the goal of describing the “front page”
privacy practices of Just Plain Sites.
2.1 Overview
A small but critical aspect of a site’s visitor privacy prac-
tices can be determined by technical analysis of the site itself
on page load, including what sort of information is collected,
or at least what sort of information is requested from the
visitor.2 Therefore, we set out to characterize the infor-
mation collected by forms, pages, and policies presented in
Just Plain Sites including the various trackers and analyt-
ics, cookies, and third party content employed by JPSs. In
a second series of experiments we dug slightly deeper to ex-
amine JPS privacy practices related to the rapidly growing
practice of “social login”, especially regarding permissions
and password storage practices.
We begin with some terminology that we will maintain
throughout. We then develop a rough classification of JPSs,
and enter into our central analysis, that of the use of third
party services and cookies. Next we turn to first-party infor-
mation explicitly collected via web forms, analyzing the form
purpose and type of information collected, and ask whether
the use of the requested information is sensible. Following
that we examine the use of third party cookies. In the second
half of the paper we change focus to login practices, and es-
pecially the increasingly common practice of Facebook login,
examining the types of information requested by JPSs from
Facebook, and characterizing the information requested by
different types of JPSs. We also observe several sorts of bad
2Many less direct privacy-related things can also be deter-
mined on page load, for example, whether the site transmits
information in encrypted form, although we did not analyze
such factors.
practices being employed by JPSs, including using depre-
cated methods, and passing passwords in the clear.
2.2 Some Terminology
We will usually refer to typical adult individual visitors
to a web site as “visitors”, or sometimes “users”. The phrase
“the site” will generally refer to the site that given visitor is
explicitly aware that they have visited. If the site commu-
nicates with other sites (or web services of any sort that are
not under control of the site operator), we will refer to these
other sites/services as “third parties”. Importantly, from the
point of view of the visitor to the site, there is usually no
apparent distinction between content provided by the site it-
self, and that provided by third parties. Here, in large part,
lies a significant source of unintended privacy risk, because
visitors usually can not tell when they are sending data to
the site operators they intended to be communicating with,
or some other, unintended, organization. Note that this is
exactly the same situation as in criminal internet piracy –
there is an unintended third party “listening in” to at least
some of the conversation (although in the present case no
crime is usually taking place).
2.3 Selecting Target Sites
We wanted to obtain a list of U.S. sites in the “middle
tier”, not so small as to be trivial, but also not so large as to
be likely to have resources that would enable them to easily
hire privacy experts to manage their sites. The Quantcast
top million list (www.quantcast.com; accessed on Jun 30,
2014) contains sites used in the U.S. with more than ap-
proximately 300 monthly visits. We removed sites with a
ranking greater than 50,000, thereby excluding those having
more than approximately 30,000 monthly visits. From those
remaining we dropped ”.gov” sites, and those with “hidden
profiles” (per Quantcast’s terminology). This left 943,489
sites. Manual inspection of 100 sites sampled uniformly sug-
gested that this process resulted in a selection of sites that
roughly agreed with our sense of what a “Just Plain Site”
should be. All of our experiments began with this list of
nearly 1 million sites.
2.4 Rough Classification of JPSs
Because it is likely that different sorts of sites operate un-
der different privacy regimens, it is useful to classify sites
into categories that are likely to accord with such regimens.
There are various ways to categorize web sites. Existing so-
lutions mostly perform text/document categorization (e.g.,
similarweb), or utilize user-provided classes (e.g., dmoz).
We found both of these to be too detailed for an analysis
that covers such a large number of sites. We developed a
classification based upon what product or service is being
provided (content v. good), and who is providing it (the
site operator v. visitors), as described in Table 1.
We manually classified the 100 uniformly sampled sites.
The percentages in Table 1 represent the distribution of
classes in this set. 13% were uninterpretable. Shopping-type
sites dominate, but there are many blog-type sites as well.
Small ad networks, like Craigslist or Ebay (but smaller) are
rare. Surprisingly, social network- and forum-type sites are
relatively uncommon.
Table 1: Categories of JPSs and Representation
Content,
Web Service
Goods,
Physical Service
Single
Producer
40% - Blog,
official site,
web tool, an-
nouncements
for a club, news
44% - Online
shop, poster
site of a shop,
paid online
game
User
produced
3% - Social net-
work, forum,
wiki, group
discussions
Ad networks,
consumer
to consumer
platforms
2.5 Third Party Service Analysis
Sites often interact with third parties for various purposes,
such as requesting static resources (e.g., code libraries, im-
ages, css, fonts), analytics, ads, social widgets, web beacons,
and so on. It is generally difficult or impossible for the site
to determine the extent of a third party’s privacy practices.
When someone visits a page that accesses third party ser-
vices, some information (e.g., IP address, browser type – so-
called“fingerprinting” [18])) is sent to the third party service
provider, often without any action required by the visitor.
Usually third parties use this information for personalized
ads, improving their services, or aggregate them with other
information. Many web pages contain “social” buttons to
“like”, “tweet”, “digg”, etc., and such trackers often add third
party cookies when you visit the page, again without any ac-
tion required by the visitor. Moreover, some of these third
parties are better “ninjas” than others, not leaving tracks
such as cookies, but nonetheless gaining access to the vis-
itor’s information. For example, Facebook states that: “If
you’ve previously received a cookie from Facebook because
you either have an account or have visited facebook.com,
your browser sends us information about this cookie when
you visit a site with the “Like” button or another social plu-
gin.” (emphasis added) Note that the specific way that third
parties use cookies will vary. The Facebook Like button, for
example does not install a cookie on load, it just checks for
an existing cookie from previous visits to the Facebook site
itself. The Twitter Tweet button, by contrast, installs a
cookie on the visitor’s browser.
We define a “tracker” as any process that the site, or a
third party, may use that would create an unintentional pri-
vacy risk, for example, identifying the visitor directly via a
browser profile.3 However, many commonly employed mech-
anisms pose an unintentional privacy risk. For example,
unless the site operators goes out of their way to change
the default behavior of the Apache server, it will create un-
encrypted log files of all access to the site, left in a com-
monly known default location. Static “Side-loading” of files
(scripts, images, etc.) from third parties is a very common
practice and creates an unintentional privacy risk by virtue
of the visitor unknowingly accessing these third party sites,
thereby permitting the third party to profile the visitor who
is unwittingly accessing their site for this side-loading. An-
other very common example of this sort of tracking is the
3This definition excludes primary usage tracking, as that
would be intentional.
Table 2: Third party accesses
Description Count
Requests 252036
Responses 251802
URLs accessed 503838
Distinct URLs 201628
Distinct hosts 9580
Distinct hosts (combined) 8601
use of analytic sites, such as Google Analytics. Google, of
course, utilizes this data for their own unknowable purposes,
as well as for the intended purpose of the originating site.
More insidious are “beacons”, pieces of code that activate
when the web page is loaded, regardless of the visitor click-
ing on them. These are often essentially invisible – tiny
black images or space characters (so-called “pixel tags”) –
and may be linked to arbitrary URLs or complex javascript
code, enabling data-gathering computations without visitor
awareness.
2.6 Data Capture and Cleaning
As mentioned in the introduction, we are concerned pri-
marily with privacy practices that affect a visitor by just
loading the site’s landing page, and by clicking the available
buttons. In accordance with this policy, we do not analyze
referred domains unless there is an immediate redirect, and
then we only follow one such redirect. Also, we only con-
sider what is collected while the visitor is browsing, that is,
we do not fill in info required to take whatever “next steps”
might be possible from a page. In fact, we never fill in any
information at all, but merely look at what happens upon
clicking the available buttons.
We used PhantomJS to capture all http requests and re-
sponses on page load, ignoring “local” requests/responses
(i.e., those within the same domain or a subdomain). We
parsed the URLs into the domain, path, filename, and other
information, and then combined URLs that appeared to be
served by the same entity (for example, s1.criteo.com and
s2.criteo.com, or where the IP addresses are the same ex-
cept for the last octet).
2.7 General Description of the Dataset
Table 2 and Figure 1 provide a general sense of our data.
Among the 8,601 URLs accessed, 8,451 were analyzable4.
Among these, 82% had at least one third party access on
page load. The number of third party requests from a single
JPS page load ranges from zero to more than 150 (Figure
1). When someone visits a site, an average of 7 other orga-
nizations may know that they have been there.
2.8 Monopoly in Third Party Services
By combining the results from different sources, a third
party organization can obtain significant additional infor-
mation about a web site’s visitors. For example, if a third
party provider can trace a unique visitor across different sites
by aggregating the data it is given “on the side” (e.g., via
browser profiles), it can better estimate a visitor’s interests
4The remainder failed for various complex, uninteresting,
and/or inexplicable reasons.
Figure 1: Third party accesses per service provider
and can improve targeted advertising. Therefore, we sought
to identify the owner of third party services in our dataset.
To accomplish this we categorized URLs based on their
hostname, after truncating subdomains. Since third party
service providers often use several different domains, we had
to aggregate the domains by each owner. This task is not
straightforward, and we could not develop a fully automatic
method. Therefore we manually aggregated the domains,
considering issues such as mergers and acquisitions, and“de-
referencing” Content Delivery Networks (CDNs). For exam-
ple, Google uses numerous fronts, such as doubleclick.net,
gstatic.com, ytimg.com, and blogger.com. And fbcdn.
net, as well as any subdomain of akamaihd.net that con-
tains “fbcdn” are fronts for Facebook.
Unsurprisingly, more than 67% of the JPS web sites use
at least one service of Google. Another 19% use at least one
service of Facebook, and about 11% use services from Twit-
ter. Approximately 35% is divided among various smaller
players, like Amazon, Quantcast, and Wordpress at about
4%. (This may sum to more than 100% because sites may
use third party services from multiple providers.)
2.9 The Purposes of Third Party Requests
Some kinds of third party requests present more of a pri-
vacy risky than others. For example, side-loading“show ads.js”,
being a script, is almost certainly more dangerous than a
style sheet or image fetch [19]. We sought to character-
ize in the purpose of third party requests to the top two
players: Google and Facebook. We considered combina-
tions of several criteria such as domain (and subdomains),
path/filename, and URL parameters. It is usually not possi-
ble to correctly recognize the purpose of a third party request
just from the domain or filename. For example, Google An-
alytics uses ” utm.gif”. The content of this tiny image is
merely a “beacon”, a great deal of information, often com-
prising hundreds of bytes, is passed in the request URL.
We first recognized static resources and then worked on
ads, analytics, and other third party requests, as their recog-
nition is more challenging. Static resource URLs usually
have no parameters, or have only short, simple parameters,
and usually do not set cookies in their headers. The static
categories that we found included static CSS (.css), images
(.jpeg, .jpg, .png, .gif), javascript (.js), json, (.json), and
html (.html).
In addition to the above static URLs, we observed these
(apparent) functions5: Ads: if the domain is for an adver-
tising company and there are related keywords in the subdo-
main (e.g. ads.yahoo.com) or in the path (e.g. doubleclick.
net/pagead/ads); Analytics: if the domain is for an ana-
lytics company and there are related keywords in the sub-
domain (e.g. analytics.bigcommerce.com) or in the path
(e.g. .../track); Beacons: if there are keywords in the sub-
domain (e.g. pixel.quantserve.com) or in the path (e.g.
.../bug/pic.gif) and the URL parameters are not empty;
and Widgets: if there are keywords in the subdomain (e.g.
widgets.wp.com) or in the path (e.g. .../js/plusone.js).
Figure 2 depicts the distribution of usage patterns of third
party requests.
Figure 2: Purpose of third party requests
Figure 3 depicts the usage pattern of Google and Face-
book, the two biggest third party service providers. The
most popular Google service is analytics. In terms of pro-
viding widgets, the popularity of Google and Facebook is
almost the same.
Figure 3: Usage pattern of Google v. Facebook ser-
vices
3. FIRST-PARTY FORMS
So far we have been discussing only implicitly-collected
information, but much more invasive information, such as
so-called “Personally Identifiable Information” (PII), is of-
ten explicitly requested via html forms on the landing page.
5As only the author really knows what the javascript really
does, we characterize only what it appears to do.
In order for a visitor to decide whether the personal informa-
tion being requested is necessary, it is necessary to know the
purpose to which the information will be put. For example,
it should be a red flag for a site to request your physical mail-
ing address in order to subscribe to an electronic newsletter.
There may be a rational reason for this, but it would be use-
ful to have an explanation before making the choice about
whether to reveal this sort of information.
3.1 Web Form Purpose and Information Type
According to our analysis, 54% of JPSs collect visitors’ PII
through HTML forms. We tried to classify the purpose of
web forms and the information type of their fields. In
order to classify the information type of the form (Figure
4) we considered the name, label, and default value of the
fields. When a field had no label we considered the text
of a previous sibling if a label was available there. Finally,
if we still could not classify the information requested, we
checked the first parent of the DOM element and also the
text in the field, if any. In order to classify the purpose of
the form (Figure ), we considered the text of the first child of
the form (hopefully a title or short description of the form’s
purpose), the previous sibling of the form (often a title for
the form is there), and also the text body surrounding the
form, if it was not unreasonably long. Table 3 depicts the
type-by-form results.
Figure 4: Information collected in web forms
Figure 5: Purpose of collected information
In order to assess the quality of our method, we manu-
ally coded a sample of 100 forms. In fifty-eight (58%) of
these, our automatic and manual analyses matched exactly.
Among the rest, there were 131 errors, both false positive
and false negative, totaling approximately 6.24%.
3.2 Uses of Requested Information
Unsurprisingly, visitor names and email addresses are the
most commonly requested information. These are used for
many purposes such as registration, feeds, etc. After these,
the most-collected PII is phone numbers, and a smaller num-
ber of sites collect other PII, such as birthdates.
We wanted to sample the reasons for birthdate being col-
lected, and to assess whether it seemed to make sense to
collect this information, given the purpose of the site. Ta-
ble 4 indicates the results of this exploration. In most cases
where birthdate was collected we could determine whether
it was collected in full or partially, and whether the pur-
pose for collecting such information seemed to make sense.
For example, it clearly makes sense for an insurance com-
pany to want to know an applicant’s birthdate. Similarly, it
makes sense for a “men’s supper club”, to want to know a
partial birthdate, which would indicate the registrant’s age,
although not his or her exact birthday. These are both sen-
sible uses of information. On the other hand, it makes less
sense for a summer camp to require full birthdate informa-
tion; it may need to know the applicant’s age, but then it
could request partial birthdate information, or equivalently,
simply request the applicant’s age. Table 4 also indicates
whether the site explicitly indicated the reason for collecting
this data. Notice that in almost no case was this explicitly
stated, although in a few we deemed it obvious.
4. THIRD PARTY COOKIES
As mentioned above, a specific sort of tracking is repre-
sented by third party cookies, which many sites leave on
visitors’ browsers. We conducted a survey of third party
cookies based upon two uniform random samples of 1000
and 10000 JPS from our original dataset. As in the pre-
vious experiments, we used PhantomJs to capture external
resources fetched during webpage load, including Javascript
libraries, images, css files, trackers, and ad network referrals.
We evaluated how many web sites use third party cookies
(around 50%), the lifetime of third party cookies in com-
parison to “own cookies” (those from the visited site), and
the popularity of various third party cookie domains. Un-
less otherwise stated, the following results arise from the 10k
dataset.
Those domains providing more than 5% of third party
cookies were (rounded): .doubleclick.net: 18%, .google.
com: 9%, .twitter.com: 7%, .score-card-research.com:
7%, .adnxs.com: 7%, and .youtube.com: 6%. One can
see that most third party cookies come from ad or social
networks. The lifetimes of cookies were not very variable:
most cookies’ lifetimes are over a year (own: 52% v. 3rd:
33%). Next to this, most own cookies have “session” du-
rations (own: 8% v. 3rd: 2%), whereas most third party
cookies have one hour durations (own: 1% v. 3rd: 6%),
followed by 1 year durations (own: 2% v. 3rd: 5%).
5. THIRD PARTY LOGINS
Third party login, such as “signup/login with Facebook”,
is becoming increasingly popular among JPSs. Most visi-
tors are presumably aware that some information is shared
between the local site and Facebook when such a login is
employed, at least when specific permissions are asked in a
dialog box. However, visitors are probably not aware of the
details of this sharing.6
Detecting Facebook login on a site is complicated by the
variety of ways in which it can be implemented. However,
it is easier to detect automatically in comparison with, for
example, OpenID with a variety of interfaces, or Janrain
with Ajax implementations, because the code for Facebook
login is highly determined by Facebook, so we can detect it
by checking for a specific URL in a dialog window, or in the
page after clicking login links or buttons on the web site.
For this analysis we uniformly selected a subset of 100,000
(100k) sites from our original dataset. In accordance with
our assumptions about the simplicity of JPS sites, we as-
sumed that a login/registration page would be accessed by
at most one click from the landing page. Web Site op-
erators wishing to permit Facebook login may either use
the Facebook-provided html, or may code their own custom
implementation. We used PhantomJSDriver and Firefox-
Driver to render the DOM and click on various controls
and tags. We targeted XPath: “//input[ @type= ’sub-
mit’] | //a | //button” - for custom implementations and
“//iframe[ @title= ’fb:login button Facebook Social Plugin’]
| //div[ @class= ’fb-login-button’]” - for Facebook login but-
tons, and considered only tags with login-related text such
as: “signup”, “connect with”, “facebook”, etc. Although this
method does not take into account complex Ajax interac-
tions, state information is still saved by the target URLs.
We used Selenium to click even on hidden Facebook login
buttons, if they were present in the page source. This covers
situations where the DOM is changed, for example revealing
a hidden div that appears on clicking “signup”.
We ended up with two sets of sites that use Facebook lo-
gin: 1,191 sites obtained from the BuiltWith statistics, and
260 additional sites that use a custom Facebook login imple-
mentation, found in our 100k sample. From these two sets
(1,191 & 260) we asked (a) what specific information is re-
quested by Facebook, and (b) how many sites still generate
and explicitly store passwords, in comparison to more secure
means such as sending an activation link?7 The second ques-
tion was answered by analyzing “congratulating new user”
emails received after login, where we also noticed the use
of several problematic practices. For all of the above we
manually checked 20 random web sites from each sample.
5.1 Information Requested from Facebook
Detailed results are provided in Table 5, giving the top
10 specific permissions are requests. Naturally, specific per-
missions are requested more often in the case of a custom
implementation of Facebook login: only 8% web sites use de-
fault “public profile” permissions, whereas 31% of ”ready to
copy-paste” Facebook login buttons use the defaults. More
interesting are the exact permissions JPSs ask for, which are
in some situations, redundant. For example, “user birthday”
is very popular, despite the Facebook’s guidelines: “Use any
available public profile information before asking for a per-
mission. For example, there is an age range field included
6Several studies, e.g., [20], have studied the permissions re-
quested by Facebook apps, but not local web sites that use
Facebook login.
7Social login can also be done via third party platforms,
such as eventbrite.com. We did not restrict redirections
for signup/login.
Table 3: Distribution of PII types based on form type
EMail Name Phone Zip City Addr. St. Org. St. Bd.
Contact 96% 53% 31% 17% 16% 16% 11% 8% 5% 1%
Order 83% 43% 39% 19% 14% 9% 7% 14% 5% 3%
Referral 84% 50% 12% 13% 7% 4% 3% 4% 2% 1%
Registration 43% 12% 6% 3% 3% 2% 1% 2% 0% 0%
Reservation 79% 45% 55% 18% 13% 13% 8% 3% 0% 0%
Store Locator 11% 0% 11% 56% 22% 22% 11% 0% 11% 0%
Subscription 95% 31% 7% 6% 4% 4% 2% 2% 1% 0%
Unknown 79% 48% 26% 16% 14% 10% 7% 7% 4% 2%
User Access 34% 17% 11% 14% 9% 6% 6% 6% 6% 3%
User Feedback 94% 69% 32% 4% 4% 3% 2% 5% 1% 0%
Table 4: Manually examined examples of birthdate requests
Page Purpose Full BD? Purpose Rational? Explained?
Life Insurance Quote Full Need for Process Yes No but Obvious
Heath Insurance
Quote
Full Need for Process Yes No but Obvious
Auto Insurance
Quote
Full Need for Process Yes No
International Stu-
dent Request Info
Full Identity Yes No
Loan Information
Request
Full - No No
Subscription Partial Special Offers Yes No
Special Offer Sub-
scription
Full Check Age Yes Yes
Join Club Full Check Age Yes Yes
Alumni Information
Update
Full DoubleCheck
Identity
? No
Apply for Graduate
Program
Full Identity Yes No
Subscription Infor-
mation Card
Full - No No but Obvious
Camp Registration Full - No Just
needs age
Yes
Special Offer Sub-
scription
Partial Special Offers Yes No
Funeral Arrange-
ment
Full - Yes Yes
Membership Full - No No
Membership Need for Process Yes No
Subscription Full Need for Process Yes No
For Magical Spells Full Need for Magical
Process
Yes No
Free Spell Consulta-
tion Form
Full Need for Process Yes No
Application Form Full - No No
Table 5: Information requests at Facebook login (Left over 260 sites, Right over 1,191 sites)
Custom Implementation Login Button
Permission Percentage Permission Percentage
email 90% email 67%
user birthday 28% user birthday 33%
publish stream 23% <default> 31%
user location 17% publish stream 22%
read stream 10% (offline access) 13%
user about me 9% user about me 12%
(offline access) 9% user location 10%
user likes 9% user likes 8%
<default> 8% read stream 7%
publish actions 8% status update 5%
in the public profile...” Also, some JPSs are still using dep-
recated permissions, such as “offline access”.
5.2 Clustering for Facebook JPSs
As expected, Facebook login permission requests differ for
different categories of web site, and at the same time result
in natural clusters. According to our four-way categoriza-
tion, depicted in Figure 1, among the 260 sites in the smaller
sample, 48% were shopping sites, 34% were blogs, 17% were
social, and 1% were ad sites. We decided to explore or-
ganic clustering based upon the permissions requested by
these sites, as described above. We began with the 48 sites
requesting Facebook permissions from those requested by
JPSs with custom Facebook login code (from the experi-
ment with 100k samples). We first combined the permis-
sions requested by less than 5% of the sites into a single
attribute “other”.8 We clustered the resulting data using
Weka’s XMean algorithm. This resulted in a stable cluster-
ing based upon 13 features. The final clusters, ordered by
amount of information requested, are summarized in Table
6 (next page).
Table 7 presents the distribution of site categories among
each cluster. Several interesting observations can be made
from this data. For example, just asking for email seems
to be insufficient for most social networks; only 9% of the
“User management” category (i.e., asking for email only, or
nothing at all) are social networks. Also, the policy adopted
by “Promotion” sites (requesting mainly email and the abil-
ity to publish on the visitor’s stream, and sometimes other
details) is equally popular among the four categories of JPSs
(except ads which are rare in the data to begin with). As we
proceed from top to bottom in the table, corresponding to
more information being requested, blogs become less com-
mon, whereas social networks become more common. Shop-
ping sites appear to be bi-modal between those that request
minimum versus maximum information (48% v. 49%).
We also asked the opposite question: What permissions
are popular in the different web site categories? Figure 6
represents the top 20 (of 48) differences (below this threshold
the difference are too small to interpret).
Social sites usually request more top Facebook informa-
tion than other categories, and defaults are not often re-
quested by this type of site. Defaults and publish actions
8If the site requested only default permissions (actually, ask-
ing for a public profile), we did not consider “default” as a
separate attribute.
Table 7: Distribution of categories by cluster (%)
Cluster Blog Shop Social Ads
User management 42 48 9 1
Promotion 29 24 24 2
Profile management 20 49 30 2
Figure 6: Differential usage of information in Face-
book login requests
are commonly requested by blogs. Somewhat surprisingly,
so is friend location. Offline access (which is deprecated),
and visitor status, are often requested by shopping sites.
Shopping sites actually vary the most for requested infor-
mation. This may be a result of natural variability in the
type of products offered.
It seemed odd to us that so many blogs were interested in
friend locations, so we examined some of them manually, and
noticed that many were political, for example: don-brown-
4tx14.org (Don Brown for congress), clark-republicans.
org, citizen-actionwi.org, raise-your-vote.com, save-
pacifica.com, and yes-on-1tn.org. It makes some sense
to ask for friends in order to build a political network. A
finer-grained categorization might have put these sorts of
sites into a separate category.
Table 6: clusters ordered by amount of information requested
Number % Requested Data Pseudonym
148 57% Email only, or nothing “User Management”
51 20% Mainly email and ability to publish on visitor’s stream, and sometimes
other details.
”Promotion”
61 23% More profile information, such as email, birthdate, location, plus some-
times the ability to publish on the visitor’s stream, and/or other details.
”Profile Management”
6. PASSING PASSWORDS IN THE CLEAR
Actual registration is at the limit of complexity that we
were able to automatically explore. While there are many
“safe” ways to deal with passwords, such as sending re-pass-
wording links, or sending one-time temporary passwords,
many JPSs create a password for a new user, and then
email it, unencrypted, to the user. Surprisingly, this is even
the case for some sites that use social logins. Some popu-
lar platforms, such as Magento or Wordpress, provide tools
for safe password exchange with email templates, but their
defaults are unsafe, and JPS operators generally will not
change these. We examined the prevalence of bad password
practices by inspecting emails received after site registration:
approximately 10% of sites using custom registration imple-
mentations sent a plain text password via email, whereas
only 2% of those employed an activation link. Among sites
using a login button, 4% sent a plain text password in email,
versus 1% sending an activation link. Our statistics here are
somewhat biased because we were unable to automatically
answer a CAPTCHA test or enter a separate email during
the process of registration. Regardless, these results provide
a lower bound on the surprising number of sites that employ
unsafe password practices.
7. DISCUSSION
7.1 Result Highlights
We have observed that JPS share a great deal of informa-
tion with third parties, mostly without their visitors’ knowl-
edge, and probably without the JPS operators understand-
ing what is being shared, nor the implications of this sharing.
When you visit a site of the sort that we have studied, an
average of 7 third party organizations find out about you, at
least in terms of your browser profile. 82% of JPSs send at
least one request to third party sites when they load. More
than 67% of JPSs use at least one service of Google, and 19%
use at least one service of Facebook. Setting aside static re-
source usage, which is generally considered less of a privacy
concern, the most popular third party service is analytics,
used by 53% of JPSs. Whenever social icons appear on a
page, for example a Facebook “like” button, Facebook may
be finding out that you have visited that page, even just on
page load, without any button having to be clicked!
JPSs are collecting a great deal of information from their
community. 49% of JPSs explicitly ask for visitors’ email.
When Facebook login is used, 23% of JPSs request full pro-
file management permissions from Facebook, and some are
even requesting friend location information.
JPSs permit a great deal of tracking of their community.
Third party cookies are used by more than 50% of JPSs,
and the most popular third parties, Google and Twitter,
use cookies for tracking. Both “own” and third party cookies
usually live more than one year. Furthermore, around 30%
of JPSs that use Facebook login ask for user birthday, even
given Facebook’s guidance against this.
Deprecated permissions are still commonly requested, and
JPSs often fail to update to the latest privacy practices. At
least 5-10% of web sites with Facebook login still store and
send passwords explicitly. This situation is worse with self-
implemented user management; the default Magento email
template sends the password explicitly, and the same is true
for some Wordpress plug-ins.
7.2 Limitations and Improvements
Automatic analysis of complex web sites is very difficult,
largely because of the use of iframes, rest widgets, and java-
script. Fortunately, our focus on JPSs ameliorates this prob-
lem slightly, as a smaller fraction of JPSs use sophisticated
methods, or the widgetry they do use is well understood,
such as third party login methods used in the default man-
ner recommended by the provider. Ajax-based crawling, al-
though much more complex, would enable a greater range
of data gathering. It would also be useful to complement
our observations with “ground truth”, for example by way
of surveys of the operators of JPSs.
7.3 Conclusions
Generally speaking our analyzes support our expectation
that many of the practices of Just Plain Sites are potentially
dangerous to visitor privacy. Our goal is not to scold JPS
operators, but to raise awareness, both among JPS operators
and among visitors to such sites. Both of these constituen-
cies would probably be surprised, if not shocked, at what
they may be inadvertently putting at risk. For JPSs on the
web, collecting private data may sometimes be important to
the site operators, and sometimes they may be aware of it
– we are not claiming that visiting these sites always con-
stitutes an actual danger of invasion of privacy; it may well
be that such information leakage offers a benefit to the site
operators and visitors, for example, by improving targeted
advertising. But much of the time it is probably not impor-
tant, and the site operators are not aware of it. Compare
this with top tier sites where, even if the visitors are not
aware or concerned with what is being taken from them, it
is nearly certain that the site operators are well aware of
these details. Indeed, in many cases this is their explicit
business model, and when it is not their business model to
sell out their visitors, such top tier sites have the resources to
ensure that they understand and properly implement best
privacy practices. This is not so for JPSs. Hopefully our
work can move JPS visitors a small way towards having
a richer understanding of what is going on when they visit
these sites, and at the same time move JPS operators a small
way towards awareness of potential problems, and towards
properly implementing best privacy practices.
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APPENDIX: JUST PLAIN (MOBILE) APPS
JPSs are often accessed via smartphone or tablet apps.
Indeed, in some cases this is the primary means of access.
Therefore, it would make sense to analyze mobile clients.
Unfortunately, the app world is so different from the web
that we were unable to make our methods apply without
basically starting over. First off, scraping apps, as com-
pared to scraping web sites, is complicated, even in the case
of Android’s xml-based layout of screens. Because of greater
interface design freedom, it is hard to properly detect mo-
bile analogues of forms, and the correspondences among po-
sitionally separated labels and inputs. Moreover many app
developers us dynamic text. On the other hand, app user
management, third party logins, analytics, and other prac-
tices are similar to web sites.
We tried to answer the questions of how many JPS web
sites have separate mobile versions, and how many JPSs
have supporting mobile apps. However, only about 10%
of the JPS sites that we accessed had mobile redirection
(e.g., “/m.”, “.mobi”). Many sites now use“universal layout”,
with separate divs, or an entirely separate site for mobile
access. We are unable to see such solutions in our existing
dataset. In a second analysis we searched Google Play for
apps matching each JPS web site by name. The percentage
was very low as well, perhaps because in many cases, as
mentioned, the developers of the app for a JPS are not the
same as the JPS. These preliminary analyses yielded low
rates and difficult-to-interpret results.
Fortunately for the user, mobile developers have to try
somewhat harder to get data off the phone or pad than than
when a small mom-and-pop shop puts up their own web site,
so mobile developers are somewhat more likely to know what
they are doing in this regard, or at least know that they are
doing it. Also, apps that are distributed by online stores,
such as iTunes and Google Play, are subject to fairly strict
policies regarding data collection and privacy.
For all these reasons we put our analysis of JPS apps
(JPAs?) on hold for another time.
